Since the dissolution of the Whig Party in the 1850s, and subsequent emergence of Lincoln’s Republican Party, the two-party system has reigned unchallenged in American politics. The relative political stability of the post-World War II Era further entrenched this duality as a seemingly predetermined societal norm. This is the status quo of American politics. But is this inevitable? Are burgeoning whispers of independent political movements and third parties just smoke? Or has the strain of polarization pushed the existing political system to the cusp of a realignment?

This is the first in a multi-part series that explores this very question.

The present national environment has grown unusually favorable for politically independent candidates. In a January 2021 Gallup poll, 50% of American voters surveyed identified as politically unaffiliated. In the more than 40 years that Gallup has polled this question, the number of self-identified independents had never before reached a majority. This unprecedented result is part of a broader trend. In 1988 when Gallup first asked, roughly 30% of Americans identified as independents. That percentage has climbed steadily upward since 1988 and today averages around 45%, with neither major party consistently holding the loyalty of more than 30% of voters.

A two-party system where neither party is particularly popular may present an opportunity for independent candidates to run disruptive campaigns. In the upcoming 2022 midterm elections, the Utah Senate race stands out as a notable example of this moment.

Republican incumbent Mike Lee will not face a Democrat in the general election in Utah. Rather, independent candidate and former Republican Evan McMullin will challenge Senator Lee. McMullin gained national notoriety in 2016 when he ran for President as an independent, garnering a surprisingly strong 22% of the vote in his home state. The former CIA officer and congressional staffer framed his 2016 campaign as an “alternative” for voters in Utah to express their dissatisfaction with Secretary Clinton and then-candidate Trump. This time, McMullin is not planning to be a protest vote. He is running to win.

McMullin’s decision to challenge Senator Lee appears well timed. Lee’s job approval among likely voters in Utah has polled consistently at or below 45% for the past year. Anemic poll numbers do not necessarily spell defeat. Just ask Mitch McConnell, who was polling at 39% in Kentucky less than two weeks before cruising to re-election in 2020. But the data suggests that Senator Lee is on sufficiently unstable ground at home to warrant an electoral challenge.

The McMullin campaign has built a politically diverse coalition of support. The endorsements of national Republicans such as Michael Steele and Adam Kinzinger firmly establish McMullin’s conservative bona fides. High-profile current and former Democrats like Howard Dean and Andrew Yang have also thrown their support behind McMullin. At the local level, the Utah Democratic Party on April 24th voted for the first time in the state party’s history to not field a candidate. They instead endorsed McMullin, a former Republican. McMullin’s unique suite of bipartisan endorsements has already helped attract more than $3 million in direct campaign contributions. Facing an unpopular incumbent with a formidable campaign at his back, Evan McMullin’s independent candidacy appears well equipped to turn heads in Utah in 2022. But will the attention translate into votes on election day?

McMullin’s campaign faces significant historical headwinds. Credible independent or third-party Senate candidates, although unusual, are far from unique. Since the end of World War II, 38 independent or third-party senate campaigns have garnered at least 15% of the vote. Of those 38 candidates, only seven successfully won a senate seat. Of those seven, three – Harry F. Byrd Jr., Joe Lieberman, and Lisa Murkowski – were incumbent Senators who had previously been elected as either Democrats or Republicans, and three others – Strom Thurmond, Bernie Sanders, and Angus King – had previously won multiple statewide elections to other political offices. Only one, James L. Buckley, was elected to the US Senate in 1970 from the state of New York on the Conservative Party ticket with no prior experience in elected office. In 2022, McMullin is seeking to replicate this exceedingly rare feat.

Successful independent Senate runs since 1945:

As stated previously, Gallup polling data suggests that voters in the present national environment feel unusually receptive to independent politics. Unfortunately for McMullin, the American public’s independent streak has not yet translated into meaningful change at the ballot box. Looking at US Senate races specifically, in 1988 only 1.5% of all US senate ballots were cast for independent or third-party candidates. In the four decades since, that number has never been higher than 7% and reached just 4% in 2020. Nearly half of Americans do not strongly identify as either Republicans or Democrats. And yet, greater than 90% of voters consistently cast ballots for candidates belonging to one party or the other.

There are many likely explanations for this asymmetry. Voters who feel a greater sense of party loyalty are more likely to turn out on election day than independent voters. Additionally, although demand for independent candidates may be at a multi-decade high, supply remains scarce. Voters rarely have a credible third option on election day. McMullin’s campaign hopes to address the supply problem by providing a serious independent option for voters in Utah. McMullin’s background, 2016 Presidential campaign, and slate of big-wig endorsements certainly grant him credibility.

But leveraging credibility into a campaign message that builds a winning independent coalition will be the greater challenge. McMullin’s campaign message has thus far painted with broad strokes, casting a traditional conservative tone that aligns with Utah’s red hue while remaining sufficiently abstract on policy so as to not alienate Democratic voters. Although such a big tent approach makes sense in McMullin’s position, it is not yet clear how far McMullin will need to stretch to one side or the other of the political spectrum in order to build a majority coalition. And if the tent becomes too wide, McMullin risks alienating his most loyal supporters.

Thus, the McMullin campaign demonstrates a critical pitfall of the independent lane of American politics. American voters who identify as independents hold a wide range of different political views and are not necessarily neatly grouped together in the political center. Therefore, uniting politically independent American voters into a winning majority coalition is no simple task, even for a centrist candidate. If McMullin cannot find enough independent-minded voters in the political center to win, he may need to expand his reach by appealing to voters to his left or his right. Such a move would be a considerable gamble. A candidate who tries to be everything for everyone risks inspiring no one on election day.

A recent Dan Jones & Associates poll in Utah showed a tight race, with Lee garnering 41% support and McMullin 37%. But with nearly 20% of voters currently undecided, the McMullin campaign faces difficult choices ahead. And the question remains, when presented with a credible third choice, will voters’ frustration with both major parties actually translate into change on election day? Or will the status quo remain steady? Wherever the final tally lands in November, historic intrigue abounds in Utah’s 2022 senate race and the results may tell us a great deal about the state of the two-party system in America.

Response to “Responsible Cyber Offense” by Peri Adams et. al. in Lawfare

In 1972, when a Republican US President flew halfway around the world to establish relations with a Communist, both leaders openly recognized the irony of the moment. In the subsequent Shanghai Communique, President Nixon and Chairman Mao began by honestly outlining areas of inflexible disagreement between the two nations. The Communique then focused intently on opportunities for mutual cooperation, an approach that led to a more contained Soviet Union and a predictable relationship with China for nearly half a century. Finding opportunities for diplomatic agreement in cyberspace will require a similarly self-aware commitment to the art of the possible.

In their Lawfare article “Responsible Cyber Offense,” Peri Adams et. al. recognize that, given the ubiquity of state-sponsored cyber espionage, cyber diplomacy will require “a certain hardheadedness and even cynicism.” Akin to the Shanghai Communique, the article recommends recognizing the hypocrisy of an effort to limit cyber conflict and then focusing on areas of mutual interest. Specifically, the article proposes “drawing lines between responsible and irresponsible operations in cyberspace.” It will be difficult to foster this level of honest dialogue among cyber-capable nations for whom deniability is a default setting. However, history demonstrates that diplomacy, when transparent and mutually beneficial, can penetrate such barriers. Therefore, as a theoretical exercise in the practice of cyber diplomacy as realpolitik, the article’s strategy is reasonable, as it approaches the topic honestly and provides a logical foundation for a discussion of mutually beneficial norms.

The article’s overarching diplomatic framework is sound. However, the authors’ specific recommendations may not be implementable as they are currently written. The article details six opportunities for multilateral agreement that, if agreed to, would certainly lead to more stable and predictable operations in cyberspace, even while accepting the reality of ongoing cyber espionage. The article’s six proposals are:

• Test Tools Before Use

• Avoid Indiscriminate Targeting

• Prohibit Targets Throughout the Operational Life Cycle

• Constrain Automation

• Prevent Criminal and Third-Party Access to Backdoors

• Responsible Operational Design, Engineering and Oversight

When seeking opportunities for broad international cyber agreement, it helps to be specific. The authors recognize that if norms are too broad, they can be “technically ambiguous and impossible to enforce.” The article’s recommendations are appropriately specific. Therefore, the authors’ vision, if implemented, would significantly improve the global stability of cyberspace. However, most of the article’s recommendations are likely not achievable.

An agreement to “test tools before use” is the most realistic recommendation. Testing is already a critical step in the design and implementation of malware. Even among nations with vastly different geopolitical goals, an agreement to test malware for security and stability before deployment is reasonable. Similarly, agreement regarding “responsible operational design, engineering, and oversight” may also be achievable, with the caveat that countries, such as Russia, that operate cyber capabilities in a decentralized manner will struggle to implement strong oversight. These two opportunities for cooperation exist because rigorous testing and responsible design deliver benefits without constraining the cyber capabilities of nations. However, the remaining recommendations do not meet this standard and fail to account for the priorities of relevant nation-state cyber actors.

The key shortcoming of the article’s recommendations is the western perspective from which they are crafted. The authors assert that nation-states have “no good reason to resist” their proposed rules of the road. From the perspective of the US and its allies, nations that rely on offensive cyber operations primarily as a precision tool for espionage and clandestine influence, there is indeed no reason to resist. But some cyber capable adversaries have reasons to resist. For example, when Russia launched the NotPetya cyberattack in 2017, the malware employed both “automation” and “indiscriminate targeting,” two practices that the article recommends banning. It is likely that the Kremlin views NotPetya as a highly successful operation. Therefore, it would be difficult to convince Moscow to forgo the use of such tools in the future. In addition, the article recognizes that Russia may be unwilling to “prevent criminal and third-party access to backdoors” due to its support of private domestic hacking groups. North Korea offers an even more striking example of this effect, given the government’s direct perpetration of ransomware attacks to help keep the lights on in Pyongyang. It is unlikely that these governments would commit to eliminating irresponsible cyber activities as defined in the Lawfare article, and any international cyber agreement that does not include Russia or North Korea would be largely symbolic.

To address the obvious diplomatic impasse, the article suggests that, even in the absence of an agreement, the US should publicly articulate what it “considers to be an irresponsible activity… [in order to] gain international political leverage.” This recommendation is out of step with the authors’ goals. Although clarifying its singular position publicly may carry some domestic political benefits, a soapbox declaration from the US would do little to sway the views of adversaries overseas, and may even harden opposition. If the goal of the article’s strategy is meaningful multilateral agreement on responsible cyber activities, the US would be wise to focus on the negotiating table rather than the bully pulpit.

The “Responsible Cyber Offense” Lawfare article provides a helpful starting point with several recommendations that are worthy of further exploration. By drawing a dividing line between responsible and irresponsible cyber activities, the authors offer a reasonable diplomatic approach. However, in their specific recommendations, the authors do not adequately account for the starkly different geopolitical priorities that exist in the capitals of key nation-state cyber actors. Although it is unlikely that the article can stimulate international agreement as written, the authors articulate a valid framework that can help build towards a more predictable long-term operating rhythm in cyberspace.